Whaling and International Law by Azaria, D
	 1 
Book Review: Whaling and International Law  
Danae Azaria 
 
Whaling and International Law by Malgosia Fitzmaurice is a timely, 
comprehensive and engaging work. Timely because it responds to the recent 
Whaling in Antarctica case before the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) on the 
dispute between Japan and Australia concerning Japan’s scientific whaling,1 and to 
the developments that followed this Judgment. Comprehensive because it focuses 
on important issues concerning whaling placing the International Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling (‘ICRW’) in its historical and modern landscape. The 
book looks at the political and economic background, which led to the conclusion 
of the 1931 and 1937 Conventions, and contrasts them to the 1946 ICRW that 
forms the focus of the study. It examines the latter treaty through the lenses of 
the dispute that was brought before the ICJ, and discusses numerous treaties that 
apply to whaling and their relationship to the ICRW, namely: the Law of the Sea 
Convention (‘LOSC’), the Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of 
the Baltic and North Seas (‘ASCOBANS’), the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (‘CITES’), and the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (‘CBD’). Engaging because it deals in a balanced way with 
legal questions that touch on science, ethics and politics, and does so in a way that 
interests both specialists in international environmental law as well as general 
international lawyers.  
The structure of the book is logical and thematic, analysing legal questions 
surrounding the activity of whaling. It begins by providing the history of whaling 
(Chapter 2), moves on to the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling (Chapter 3), and the International Whaling Commission (Chapter 4), 
touches on the argument that non-indigenous commercial whaling may be part of 
peoples’ cultural diversity (Chapter 5) as well as animal rights (Chapter 6). It then 
discusses the interaction of the International Whaling Commission with other 
organisations and treaties (Chapter 7), and analyses indigenous whaling (Chapter 
8) before providing a case study on the protection of the narwhal whale (Chapter 
9) and a set of conclusions (Chapter 10). The issues discussed are numerous, but 
this review will focus on four points, which demonstrate the manner in which the 
book approaches international law governing whaling, as well as wider questions 
of general international law. 
 
1. Treaty Bodies, Amendment, and Interpretation 
 
The first point relates to treaties over time, and more particularly their 
amendment and interpretation in light of the creation of treaty bodies. The ICRW 
established the International Whaling Commission (‘IWC’), which is essentially a 
Conference of Parties: it is comprised of delegates of all states parties. The IWC 
can amend the treaty by taking decisions on the basis of a three-quarter majority, 
while parties can opt-out from a decision by objecting to it. It can also adopt non-
binding recommendations. The book approaches the IWC through the prism of 																																																								
1 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2014, p. 226 
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the Whaling in Antarctica case. In relation to the amendment procedure, in the 
Whaling in Antarctica case the ICJ considered that the IWC had amended the 
Schedule many times, and immediately after this observation it suggested that the 
functions conferred on the IWC have made the ICRW an ‘evolving instrument’.2 
Fitzmaurice persuasively argues that the opting-out system and the three-quarter 
majority voting system are not features that necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
the Convention is a ‘evolving instrument’. Rather, they may suggest that the treaty 
terms are static for those states that have opted out from the amendments by 
objecting (p. 91).  
In relation to treaty interpretation in the Whaling in Antarctica case the Court 
found that while Article VI of the ICRW states that ‘[t]he Commission may […] 
make recommendations [which] are not binding, when [these recommendations] 
are adopted by consensus or by a unanimous vote, they may be relevant for the 
interpretation of the Convention.’ 3  The Court further explained that IWC 
resolutions adopted without the support of all States parties to the Convention, 
and without the concurrence of Japan, cannot be regarded as subsequent 
agreement, or as subsequent practice within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) and 
(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’). This phraseology 
suggests that recommendations adopted by consensus, as long as they are not 
objected to by any treaty party, may establish the agreement of the parties 
concerning the treaty’s interpretation within the meaning of VCLT Article 31(3)(a) 
and (b). The importance of the Judgment in this respect is also demonstrated by 
the fact that the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) in its 66th (2014) session, 
almost a month after the Judgment was issued, considered the Second Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in 
relation to the Interpretation of Treaties. The ILC adopted on first reading Draft 
Conclusion 10 on ‘Decisions adopted within the framework of a Conference of 
States Parties’, and in this context it considered the ICJ Judgment and followed its 
approach. Draft Conclusion 10 recognises that decisions of Conferences of 
Parties may embody a subsequent agreement or give rise to subsequent practice 
within the meaning of VCLT Article 31(3)(a) and (b) and subsequent practice 
within the meaning of VCLT Article 32.  
 
2. Standing to Invoke Responsibility for a Breach of Community Interest 
Obligations 
 
The second point that Whaling and International Law allows the reader to reflect 
on is standing to invoke responsibility for breaches of international obligations 
that are owed collectively among a group of states transcending their individual 
interests: obligations erga omnes partes. Under the Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘ASR’), 4  which reflect the state of 
customary international law on this point, while injured states may claim cessation, 																																																								
2 Ibid, para. 45.  
3 Ibid, para. 46. 
4 Text of the draft articles on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts, Report of the 
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assurances and guarantees of non-repetition of the internationally wrongful act, 
and reparation (ASR Article 42), states other than an injured state may claim cessation 
and assurances of non-repetition of the wrongful act (ASR Article 48). 5 
Fitzmaurice argues that despite some arguments to the contrary (p. 112), 
obligations under the ICRW are erga omnes partes. Any treaty party as a state other 
than the injured state may invoke responsibility for the breach of these 
obligations, and the Whaling in Antarctica case is a case of such community interest 
standing, as Australia pleaded before the Court (pp. 109-112). 
However, the Whaling in Antarctica case raises another point about settling 
international disputes concerning erga omnes partes obligations through international 
courts and tribunals. While standing is a matter of admissibility separate to the 
issue of jurisdiction, restrictions on jurisdiction may be a reason for which a 
claimant may choose to present its standing in a manner that does not prejudice 
jurisdiction. Australia requested only a declaration that Japan’s conduct was in 
breach of its treaty obligations, and an order requiring the cessation of Japan’s 
internationally wrongful acts.6 This may suggest that Australia was bringing a 
complaint not as an injured state, but as a state other than the injured state. 
However, the fact that Australia has not claimed reparation does not necessarily 
mean that it is not entitled to it as an injured state. Rather, Australia’s claim could 
be seen as an instance where a state brought an express claim as a state other than 
the injured state, because bringing a claim as an injured state might have 
prejudiced the Court’s jurisdiction. In the oral pleadings, Australia’s counsel 
expressly stated that Australia brought the claim not as an injured state, but on behalf 
of a collective interest.7 It is possible that Australia in fact was an injured state, 
because part of Japan’s conduct complained of was taking place within a maritime 
zone over which Australia claimed sovereign rights. But, should Australia have 
assented that it was specially affected on this particular ground in order to 
establish standing, it might have prejudiced the Court’s jurisdiction: Australia’s 
declaration to the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction did not apply to ‘any dispute 
[…] arising out of, […] or relating to the exploitation of any disputed area of or 
adjacent to any such maritime zone pending its delimitation.’  
The Court accepted that the dispute did not fall within the exception of 
Australia’s declaration of acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. It 
found that it had jurisdiction, given that the exception in Australia’s declaration to 
the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction had to do with delimitation disputes, while the 
dispute between the two parties did not involve overlapping claims over maritime 
zones. In this respect it found it ‘significant’ that Australia ‘did not contend that 
Japan’s conduct is unlawful because the whaling activities take place in the 
maritime zones over which Australia asserts sovereign rights’.8 In any event, Japan 																																																								
5 According to the ASR, as a progressive development, they may also claim reparation in the interest of the 
injured state or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. Text of the draft articles on responsibility of 
States for internationally wrongful acts with commentaries thereto, Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, 
Vol. II, pp. 31–143 at 127, para. 12.  
6 Memorial of Australia, Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), 9 May 2011, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/148/17382.pdf, para. 7.1. 
7 CR 2013/18, p. 28. 
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did not object to Australia’s pleading about its ‘community interest’ standing, 
which could be considered as implicit acceptance that Australia had standing as a 
state other than an injured state. Be that as it may, the Court did not address 
standing at all; it considered the case admissible, thus implicitly accepting 
Australia’s standing, presumably as a state other than the injured state.  
 
3. Scientific Evidence before International Courts and Tribunals 
 
The third point that Whaling and International Law skilfully demonstrates is that 
the ‘role of science in cases concerning environmental matters is as important as 
that of law’ (p. 104). An example of where the book considers this issue is in 
relation to scientific evidence before the ICJ. The book focuses on the manner in 
which the ICJ used scientific evidence in the Whaling in Antarctica case, and puts the 
analysis in the context of other relevant ICJ case law. In Pulp Mills the parties used 
experts as counsel, and the Court considered it important to state in the Judgment 
that it would be more helpful to avoid such practice and rather call experts or 
witnesses who can thus be submitted to questioning by the other party and by the 
Court.9 In contrast, in the Whaling in Antarctica case the ICJ resorted for the first 
time to scientific evidence provided by experts appointed by the parties according 
to Article 63 of the Court’s Rules. The Court did not appoint experts itself 
pursuant to Article 50 of the Court’s Statute, but relied ‘in an exceptionally 
extensive manner on expert evidence when examining relevant elements of the 
programme’s design and implementation’ (p. 104). Although for Fitzmaurice the 
Court missed a chance to resort to Court appointed experts (p. 103), she is of the 
view that the Whaling in Antarctica case ‘will set the standard regarding the use of 
experts in the adjudication of disputes that turn on scientific facts’ (p. 105). 
However, a contrast can be drawn with rules on experts of other tribunals 
some of which would have jurisdiction over disputes that may involve scientific or 
technical issues. In the Indus Waters Arbitration (India/Pakistan),10 the Tribunal 
comprised jurists and an engineer, pursuant to the arbitration clause. This 
composition may have allowed the Tribunal to deal in depth with the expert 
evidence submitted by the parties, and may illustrate how the composition of 
special arbitral tribunals in specialized areas may assist in improving the 
understanding of the technical aspects of the legal dispute (e.g. specialized arbitral 
tribunal under Annex VIII of LOSC for disputes concerning fisheries, marine 
environment and marine scientific research). This option was not available to 
Australia in relation to Japan’s JAPRA II programme: Japan has not made a 
relevant declaration accepting the jurisdiction of such tribunal pursuant to LOSC 
Article 287. But, there is some value in contemplating whether and how different 
the treatment of scientific evidence would be, if such a dispute found its way to 
such a specialised tribunal under LOSC. 
 																																																								
9 Case concerning Pulp Mills on the river Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports 
2010, p. 14 at 72, para. 167. 
10  Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India), Partial Award, 18 February 2013: 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1681; Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India), Final 
Award, 20 December 2013: https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/48. 	
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4. Indigenous Whaling and Cultural Diversity in relation to Non-
Indigenous Whaling 
 
Finally, an important aspect of the book is the discussion of indigenous 
whaling (Chapter 7) as well as cultural diversity and non-indigenous non-scientific 
whaling (Chapter 4). In relation to both issues the book analyses the human rights 
angle of these topics, as well as the manner in which they have arisen and have 
been addressed within and outside the framework of the IWC. While the ICRW 
does not include any provision concerning aboriginal whaling (‘meat and products 
of grey or right whales that are to be used exclusively for the local consumption 
by the aborigines’), the Schedule to the ICRW excludes it from the definition and 
provisions governing commercial whaling. The IWC has endeavoured to define 
aboriginal whaling over the years, but its definition and distinction from 
commercial whaling has not been sufficiently clear. This lack of clarity may have 
important side-effects: either the manner in which cultural diversity is dealt with 
by the IWC departs from the interpretation of Article 27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) by the Human Rights 
Committee (p. 251), or may allow for any aboriginal (and not only subsistence 
related) whaling (p. 260).  
In contrast, the cultural diversity argument about whaling focuses on non-
indigenous commercial whaling. Chapter 5 connects the human rights 
developments and the UNESCO instruments concerning cultural identity with the 
activity of whaling. It discusses in detail the arguments made (by Japan, Iceland, 
Norway and the Faroe Islands) and identifies the differences in the articulation of 
these arguments: for instance, while in Japan there is a spiritual and religious 
component in the cultural diversity argument (pp. 130-137), the same is not the 
case of Iceland, Norway and the Faroe Islands (pp. 138-147), whose arguments 
seem to involve a sense of ‘duty’ to ‘engage in whaling as a means of resisting the 
dominant Western/continental cultural trends […]’ (p. 148). The analysis 
concludes that the ‘survival of species should trump cultural considerations’11 by 
positing that to kill off a species in order to fulfil cultural identity would be 
detrimental to the culture itself: the culture in question will become extinct as 
soon as the species is extinct (p. 151).  
The exposition of the dilemma in Chapter 4 provides fertile ground for a 
more systemic debate about the relationship between ‘community values’ that are 
protected by or reflected in international law, especially in the form of community 
interest obligations: how does international law deal with conflicts of obligations 
that are of ‘community interest’ nature: e.g. indigenous peoples’ rights and cultural 
identity rights v. conservation of species? 
 
*** 
 
Whaling and International Law is a thought-provoking and thoroughly 
researched work. It raises and addresses questions from the point of view of the 
rules that deal with whaling, but also from the point of view of general 																																																								
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international law: the law of treaties, the law on state responsibility, science and 
the law, as well as conflicts of ‘community values’ that may also give rise to 
conflicts of norms (e.g. indigenous peoples’ rights v. conservation of species). For 
these reasons, this book is a very useful work not only for the specialist in the 
international law of fisheries, wildlife or whaling, but also for the general 
international lawyer. 
